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Abstract
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is used in the context of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to provide risk information 
regarding human performance to support risk-informed decision-making with respect to high-reliability industries.  The 
IntegrateD Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) is a new HRA method developed for internal, at-power nuclear power 
plant (NPP) events.  It was motivated by the intention to reduce unnecessary and inappropriate variability in HRA results and 
improve the reliability of human error probability (HEP) estimates.  The method has a strong foundation in human performance 
and cognitive psychology theories, and employs a cause-based quantification model.  This paper documents a study conducted to 
pilot test IDHEAS to (1) identify issues that needed to be addressed and (2) provide feedback to refine the method before the 
method was finalized.  An introduction on IDHEAS is provided first.  Then sample IDHEAS analysis results are presented for 
illustration purposes.  Next, insights from the testing in terms of method strengths and weaknesses are discussed, which is 
followed by concluding remarks.
© 2015 The Authors.Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
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1. Introduction
Human reliability analysis (HRA) can be defined as the use of systems engineering and behavioral science 
methods in order to render a complete description of the human contribution to risk and to identify ways to reduce 
that risk.  It is used in the context of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to provide risk information regarding 
human performance to support risk-informed decision-making with respect to high-reliability industries.  For 
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example, risk information from HRAs is an important input to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for 
their licensing and regulatory decisions.
In the current state of the art of HRA, variability in HRA results is still a significant issue, which in turn 
contributes to uncertainty in PRA results.  The existence and use of different HRA methods that rely on different 
assumptions, human performance frameworks, quantification algorithms, and data, as well as inconsistent 
implementation from analysts, appear to be the most common sources for the issue, resulting in raised concerns over 
the robustness of HRA methods.
With sponsorship of the U.S. NRC and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the IntegrateD Human Event 
Analysis System (IDHEAS)was developed as a new HRA method to advance the state of the art of HRA [1].  With 
an intention to reduce unnecessary and inappropriate variability and thus improve the reliability/consistency of 
human error probability (HEP) estimates, IDHEAS explicitly or implicitly integrates many good features and 
strengths of existing HRA methods and practices.  For example, the strength of ATHEANA’s qualitative analysis 
and Cause-Based Decision Tree’s (CBDT) causal structured approach that allows for traceability of HEP calculation 
has been incorporated into IDHEAS (see [1] for more discussion).  Furthermore, by updating the theoretical basis of 
HRA with the state of knowledge of human performance and cognitive psychology, IDHEAS has the ability to 
address the cognitive aspects of human behavior within the qualitative analysis, which has been identified as a 
limitation of most HRA methods, and perform the quantitative analysis with an enhanced understanding of the 
influence of contextual factors.  Since the method is based on cognition, and can, therefore, provide the basic fabric 
for handling human performance in different situations, issues such as errors of commission and errors of omission 
are treated at the level of the cognitive mechanism contributing to the error rather than as a different class of errors.
The theory of macrocognition is adapted in the human performance model within IDHEAS to elucidate the 
complexity of human cognition. Macrocognition is a term originally coined by Cacciabue and Hollnagel [2] to 
describe cognition in real-world settings, where domain experts must make complex and rapid decisions in risky or 
high-stakes situations [3]. According to the macrocognition theory, a macrocognitive function is the high level 
mental activity that must be successfully accomplished to perform a task or achieve a goal in a naturalistic 
environment [4]. In IDHEAS, five macrocognitive functions are identified: detecting and noticing, understanding 
and sensemaking, decision making, action, and team coordination [5]. 
Another important concept in IDHEAS is that of proximate causes. A proximate cause is the result or 
manifestation of the failure of a cognitive mechanism, and thus can be readily identifiable as the basic contributing 
cause of the failure of a macrocognitive function. The proximate causes are identified through an extensive literature 
survey (see [5] for more details). 
IDHEAS employs a cause-based quantification model and assesses the HEP of a human failure event (HFE) 
based on the explanations of why the HFE might occur in terms of macrocognitive functions and proximate causes. 
The model has the following two major elements (see [1] for more details).  The first is crew failure modes (CFMs). 
Similar to the Information-Decision-Action (IDA) model [6-7], the nuclear power plant (NPP) operators’ interaction 
with the plant is divided into three phases in IDHEAS: plant status assessment, response planning, and action or 
execution. These phases are proposed to occur sequentially; that is, progressing to a later phase assumes success in 
the previous phase(s). Fourteen CFMs are identified to describe the various kinds of failures that can potentially 
occur and are manifested to an outside observer in the three phases. As shown in Table 1, a majority of the CFMs 
identified fall within the plant status assessment phase. These CFMs include failing to obtain and process the critical 
data required to make a correct plant status assessment. CFMs within the response planning stage assume a correct 
plant status assessment has been made, but an error occurs in formulating the response and deciding upon a course 
of action. Finally, CFMs within the final stage of action/execution cover errors that occur in either performing the 
action incorrectly (i.e., an error of commission) or in not performing the action at all (i.e., an error of omission).
The second element is decision trees (DTs). Similar to CBDT, a decision tree (DT) is constructed to represent 
each CFM and illustrate possible paths to the CFM. The branching points within each DT elucidate the performance 
influencing factors (PIFs) that are the most relevant to the cognitive mechanisms that can result in the CFM.  The 
PIFs are contextual factors that influence the likelihood of activation of the proximate causes of macrocognitive 
function failure. For each CFM, the relevant PIFs were determined based on whether they can lead to the CFM in
question in an observable and quantifiable manner for internal, at-power NPP events (see [1, 5] for more details). 
Fig. 1 shows a DT for CFM Wrong Data Source Attended To.  If the characteristics associated with the PIF at a 
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branch point are optimal to good performance (i.e., no identifiable negative PIF characteristic), the down direction is 
chosen; otherwise the up branch is chosen.
Table 1.Crew failure modes (CFMs) within the phases they represent.
Phase of response Plant status assessment Response planning Execution
Crew failure mode 
(CFM):
Key alarm not attended to† Delay implementation† Fail to initiate execution
Data misleading or not available Misinterpret procedure† Fail to execute response correctly†
Premature termination of critical data 
collection
Choose inappropriate strategy
Critical data misperceived†
Wrong data source attended to†
Critical data not checked with appropriate 
frequency
Critical data dismissed/discounted†
Misread or skip step in procedure*†
Critical data miscommunicated**†
* May occur in either ‘Response Planning’ or ‘Execution’ phases.
** May occur in any of the three phases.
† CFM for which data was collected.
The advantage of the quantification model described above is that it can prompt analysts to assess the existence 
of and/or the “strength” or relevance of those factors that have been identified as affecting the occurrence and 
persistence of each CFM. The information concerning these factors can be determined either directly from the 
definition of the PRA scenario, or by review of operating practices, details of the procedures, the nature of the 
training and experience, etc. As a result, the HEP for an HFE is assessed on the basis of explanations of why the 
HFE might occur in terms of cognitive failure mechanisms, the consequences of those mechanisms, and the 
characteristics of the PIFs.  An important step in developing the quantification model is to establish a probability 
scale for the end point of the DT. This is achieved through expert elicitation because of the lack of real-world data. 
Fig. 1.Decision tree for CFM ‘WrongData Source Attended To’.
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This paper documents a study conducted by the author to pilot test IDHEAS to (1) identify issues that needed be 
addressed and (2) provide feedback to refine the method before the method was finalized.  Note that since some 
HEPs associated with the DT branches were not developed at the time of testing, the testing focused more on the 
qualitative insights obtained with IDHEAS.  That is, the study focused on the method’s ability to identify operator 
performance driving factors and failure mechanisms than matching the HEPs predicted by IDHEAS with failure 
ratesderived from simulator data (see Section 2).  Also note that a separate study is in progress to systematically test 
IDHEAS before its deployment.  Although the two studies are somewhat related, the latter is larger in scale in terms 
of scope and the number of analysts.  Thus, the results of this study are considered preliminary and basically a
snapshot of IDHEAS, whereas the latter study is expected to produce more conclusive findings.
2. Testing scenarios
The study tested IDHEAS with the three scenarios and five HFEs developed in the US HRA Empirical Study 
(see [8] for detailed description on scenarios and HFEs).  Scenario 1 was a total loss of feedwater (LOFW) followed 
by a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), for which three HFEs were defined.  Scenario 2 was a loss of component 
cooling water (CCW) and reactor cooling pump (RCP) sealwater, for which one HFE was defined.  Scenario 3 was 
an SGTR scenario without further complications, for which one HFE was defined.  The scenarios were simulated by 
four crews from a participating US NPP on a full-scope training simulator in that study.
In general, the IDHEAS analysis process consists of the following steps:
1. HFE identification and definition
2. Feasibility assessment in terms of various factors, including time requirements, manpower, cues, procedure, 
training, accessible location, and equipment availability
3. Characterization of the expected success path
4. Identification of critical tasks and sub-tasks and construction of a crew response tree (CRT) to represent the 
critical tasks and sub-tasks
5. Development of a timeline and an operational narrative
6. Identification of opportunities for operators to recover from errors to be incorporated into the CRT
7. CFM evaluation and HEP calculation
8. Model integration though reasonableness check of HEPs and capture of potential dependencies between actions 
in the same sequence 
Fig. 2.Crew Response Tree (CRT) of Scenario 3.
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Since the focus of the paper is on insights from the testing of IDHEAS, only the CRT and CFM evaluation results 
of Scenario 3 are shown in Fig. 2 and Table 2 for illustrative purposes.  Note that since HEPs for the DTs were not 
developed at the time of testing, HEPs are not provided in Table 2.
Table 2.Crew failure modes (CFMs) applicable for each Crew Response Tree (CRT) node.
CRT Node Crew failure modes Scenario #
2 Key Alarm Not Attended to 7
3 Misread or Skip Critical Step(s) in Procedure 13
4
Fail to Execute Simple Response Correctly 15
Misread or Skip Critical Step(s) in Procedure 13
5
Fail to Execute Complex Response Correctly 15
Misread or Skip Critical Step(s) in Procedure 13
Critical Data not Checked/Monitored with Appropriate Frequency 11
6
Fail to Execute Complex Response Correctly 15
Misread or Skip Critical Step(s) in Procedure 14
Critical Data not Checked/Monitored with Appropriate Frequency 11
7
Fail to Execute Complex Response Correctly 15
Misread or Skip Critical Step(s) in Procedure 14
Critical Data not Checked/Monitored with Appropriate Frequency 11
3. Insights from the pilot testing
3.1. Strengths
3.1.1. Structured qualitative analysis framework
IDHEAS qualitative analysis process consists of Step 1 through Step 6 listed in Section 2.  These steps constitute 
a structured framework that seems to be valid, logical and robust.  In addition, since the opportunities for both errors 
and recovery are represented as nodes on the CRT, the CRT provides a graphical tool to communicate, illustrate, 
and document the qualitative analysis results, which enhancesthe traceability of qualitative analysis.  Thus the 
qualitative analysis framework not only can help analysts at differing levels of expertiseproduce a highly detailed 
qualitative analysis but also is expected to reduce inter-analyst variability.
3.1.2. Consideration of cognitive activities
The consideration of cognitive activities is an important contributor to the adequacy of HRA predictions, because
it can help analysts understand the difficulties in operators’ situation assessment and/or response planning while a 
scenario progresses.  However, the ability to address operator cognition is a limitation of most HRA methods. 
IDHEAS is a method firmly grounded in the state-of-knowledge of human factors and human performance.  Thus, it 
is not surprising to see that IDHEAS has relatively more focus on the cognitive aspects of human performance 
compared to other HRA methods. This is evidenced by the fact that most of the CFMs fall within the status 
assessment and response planning phases (see Table 1).
Human nature never changes, becauseit is governed by a set of cognitive mechanisms that do not change from 
individual to individual.  The mechanisms dictate how human behavior is driven or shaped by various contextual 
factors, and serve as the basis for the contextual factors to express themselves through observable human behavior.  
In other words, the variability in human behavior originates from the differences in the contextual factors.  Human 
behavior will repeat itself with slight variations when the same or similar contextual factors arise in the future.  The 
concept of CFMs allows the analysts to addresses human failure at the level of the underlying cognitive mechanisms
and associated contextual factors.Thus, as mentioned above, errors of commission and errors of omission are not 
treated as a different class of errors.
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Since the theoretical framework used to ground the IDHEAS quantification model is based on cognition by 
explaining the causal relationships between observed human performance and contextual factors, the method (1) 
provides a framework for analysts to identify and characterize contextual factors and failure mechanisms that can 
cause failure at the cognitive level and (2) provides a structured and systematic way to incorporate such information 
into the quantification process.  That is, IDHEAS lends analysts the ability to understand, characterize, and then 
quantify operator cognitive failure with reduced subjectivity.  Given that complex scenarios normally involve 
relatively more cognitive challenges than easy scenarios do, IDHEAS’ ability to address operators’ diagnosis 
activities as they work through procedures is another tool to deal with scenario complexity with reduced reliance on 
analysts’ experience and expertise (see Section 3.1.3).
3.1.3. Development of detailed timelines and operational narratives to treat complexity
One of the reasons for the strength of the qualitative analysis is the need for HRA analysts to develop a detailed 
performance timeline and a detailed operational narrative to support qualitative analysis.  This activity starts at the 
early stage of the qualitative analysis process and continues in an iterative manner as more information becomes 
available down the process.  The timeline aims to capture (1) the plant status trajectory in terms of the timing of cues 
and other plant process parameters that are required for operators to correctly perform the required response or to 
realize an opportunity for recovery, and (2) the time at which operators are expected to reach critical steps in the 
procedure. The narrative focuses on how operators can successfully respond to a plant event with an emphasis on 
procedures, cues and associated timing.  Furthermore, CFMs and DTs provide a framework and a tool to identify 
complicating contextual factors.  Therefore, rather than examining a set of characteristics of the HFE, by assessing 
procedural guidance and other PSFs at an overall level, the development of the timeline and the narrative requires 
close interaction with plant experts and a thorough understanding of the scenario, the required tasks, how these are 
performed, and the contexts for these tasks. That is, the understanding of the HFE is not taken for granted as a basis 
for the quantification but is instead developed explicitly in the analysis process. As a result, many scenario-specific 
timing and performance issues can be effectively identified.  This is necessary and important for obtaining rich 
insights into the dynamics of complex scenarios.Moreover, explicit documentation of the understanding of the HFE 
increases traceability.
3.1.4. Formal self-consistent quantification approach
The causal logic model employed in IDHEAS provides a formal quantitative approach for translating qualitative 
findings into quantitative impact.  The use of CFMs and DTs ensures that HEPs are assessed in a well-defined and 
self-consistent manner with a systematic and robust exploration of PIFs linked to CFMs.  For each DT branch point, 
questions are provided to help analysts choose DT paths.  These questions, to some extent, serve as the guidance for 
quantitative analysis, and thus can help reduce undue analysts’ subjective judgment in accounting for plant- and 
scenario-specific influences on operator performance.  In summary, the quantification approach can help not only 
reduce inter-analyst variability but also, as discussed in Section 3.1.5, increase traceability.
3.1.5. Traceability
Traceability clearly constitutes one of the major strengths of IDHEAS.  As noted above, the qualitative analysis 
framework and the use of CRTs enhance the traceability of the qualitative analysis.  The traceability of the 
quantitative analysis can be attributed to its quantification approach.  The DTs establish a clear link between the 
quantification inputs and the HEP values.  This makes the derivation of the HEPs with the DTs and the identification 
of which PIFs contributed to the HEPs fully traceable and repeatable (given the same quantification inputs).  How 
the various PIFs are weighted in determining the final HEP can be determined by examining the contributions of the 
factors from the DTs.  Analysts’ answers to the questions associated with the DT branch points establish the link 
between the qualitative analysis and the quantification inputs (e.g., PIF ratings).  However, since the answers are in 
the simple form of “Yes” or “No”, the method’s ability to trace how the PIF ratings are derived from the qualitative 
analysis or the identification of the failure mechanisms associated with operational expressions is, to some extent, a 
function of analysts’ documentation of their decision process.  Particularly, good documentation of the rationale will 
be necessary to allow traceability, if (1) analysts attempt to stretch the method to incorporate PIFs that are not 
directly addressed in the DTs or (2) analysts may bias or alter the rating of PIFs based on other information 
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identified that is not covered by the questions associated with the DT branches.  Nonetheless, the questions provide 
a good framework and guidance for documenting how the issues and factors identified as relevant and important to 
the HFE failure are translated into PSF ratings.
3.1.6. Insights for error reduction
Rich insights for error reduction can be derived from IDHEAS results.  The qualitative analysis process, 
including the development of timelines and operational narratives, supports identification of plant- and scenario-
specific potential performance issues for the tasks associated with an HFE.  The causal logic model built on
cognitive failure mechanisms encourages an exploration of the interaction between dynamic scenario conditions 
with operators’ behavior, and thus provides an explanation of why and how performance issues may arise and what 
contextual factors are important.  These insights are valuable for training, plant design, and risk management 
decision-making.
3.2. Weaknesses
3.2.1. Fairly extensive resources needed for qualitative analysis
The resources needed for an IDHEAS application is a function of the detail level of the corresponding qualitative 
analysis, and is, to some extent, determined by the nature and the requirements of the qualitative analysis.  For an 
application with a highly detailed qualitative analysis, the resources can be fairly extensive.  However, the value of 
the highly detailed qualitative results suggests that this cost does have its benefits: quality and traceability of the 
qualitative results, and insights for error reduction.  The implication is that the tradeoffs between cost and thorough 
analysis need to be weighted before application of the method.
3.2.2. Judgment in evaluation of PIF levels
Questions are provided for analysts to determine PIF levels at a DT branch point.  Some questions rely, to some 
extent, on subjective descriptions rather than being based on concrete, objective, and measurable criteria.  This may 
hinder the utility of the questions, as subjectivity in analysts’ interpretation of the questions and judgment in their 
answers to the questions may become a potential source of inter-analyst variability.  In addition, the questions 
represent of the state of knowledge of the method developers of the factors that need to be evaluated to determine 
PIF levels.  The completeness of the questions needs to be tested and improved when necessary.  However, even 
with improvement, it will still be difficult to cover all scenario-specific factors.  Analysts’ judgment will be needed 
for factors that are not covered by the questions.
3.2.3. Sensitivity of binary decision trees
Although the decision tree approach to quantification can increase method traceability, the binary nature of the 
trees has been criticized for its unrealistic or simplistic representation of the real world.  Within a binary decision 
tree, each PIF can only have two levels (e.g., high vs. low, good vs. bad).  From a qualitative point of view, this 
approach does not reflect the fact that contextual conditions change on a continuous spectrum.  From a quantitative 
point of view, a change in PIF levels can lead to a significant change in the HEP (e.g., a change of one order of 
magnitude).  That is, as PIFs change on a continuous spectrum, the HEP can change abruptly as in a step function 
rather than continuously as in a continuous function.  The abrupt change in the HEP can cause the method to be 
quite sensitive to analysts’ choices of PIF levels, and becomes a source of inter-analyst variability when a PIF is in a 
gray area between the two levels defined in a DT.
3.2.4. Inadequate guidance for task analysis and CRT construction
Task analysis is a critical part of the HRA qualitative analysis process.  At its core, the purpose of task analysis is 
to identify opportunities for plant operators to fail as input to the quantification of the HEPs.  This is achieved by an 
identification and definition of the critical tasks and critical sub-tasks in the performance of the response.  As 
mentioned above, the CRT is a graphical tool to represent the critical tasks and critical sub-tasks.  Although the 
method provides a clear structure for performing and documenting a task analysis, more guidance would be needed 
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on the scope and depth of a qualitative analysis.  Particularly, there wasinadequate guidance on task decomposition 
and identification of critical tasks and critical sub-tasks.  Clarification on what constitutes a critical task or critical 
sub-task would also be helpful.
4. Conclusions
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that IDHEAS provides a structured qualitative analysis process for 
analysts to develop an understanding of scenario progression and contextual factors.  The cause-based quantification 
approach ensures self-consistent assessment of HEPs and increases traceability.  In addition, the CFMs and the DTs 
provide a framework and a tool to identify many scenario-specific performance issues, address them at the cognitive 
level, and thus serve as a coherent coupling between qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis (i.e. translating 
qualitative analysis results into quantitative impact).  However, the method is expected to be labor extensive due to 
its emphasis on qualitative analysis.  Guidance also needs to be improved to reduce unnecessary analysts’ judgment.
As noted above, the findings of this study are considered preliminary and a snapshot of the method as the method 
is still under development.  Due to the limited scope of the study, some important aspects of IDHEAS were not 
tested.  For example, it was not feasible to evaluate inter-analyst variability, which is an important HRA method 
evaluation criterion, as the present study only involved one analyst.  Similarly, since the HEPs for DT end points 
were not developed, it was not feasible to evaluate whether the method would produce potential optimistic HEPs for 
difficult HEFs anddifferentiate HFEs with different levels of complexities (i.e. method sensitivity).  Since the HFEs 
tested in the study were pre-defined, it was also not feasible to test method guidance for HFE identification.  More 
systematic testing efforts are needed to address those questions.
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